The market structure of platform competition is critically important to managers and policy makers. While network e¤ects in these markets predict concentrated industry structures, competitive e¤ects and di¤erentiation suggest the opposite. Standard theory o¤ers little guidancefull rationality models have multiple equilibria with wildly varying market concentration. We relax full rationality in favor of a boundedly rational cognitive hierarchy model. Even small departures from full rationality allow sharp predictions-there is a unique equilibrium in every case. When participants single-home and platforms are vertically di¤erentiated, a single dominant platform emerges. Multi-homing can give rise to a strong-weak market structure: One platform is accessed by all while the other is used as a backup by some agents. Horizontal di¤erentiation, in contrast, leads to fragmentation. Di¤erentiation, rather than competitive e¤ects, mainly determines market structure.
Introduction
Theorists have long been fascinated by coordination games. Part of this fascination stems from the fact that standard theory o¤ers little guidance-it predicts that coordination will occur but is silent as to which outcome will be cooperated upon. These limitations are of little practical consequence if one is interested in thought experiments like the famous one proposed by Schelling about strangers trying to meet in New York City. But coordination problems loom large in many high-stakes business settings. Managers and researchers alike stand to bene…t from a usable theory that goes beyond the non-predictions of the fully rational framework.
A coordination setting of particular importance concerns competition among online platforms, such as Google and Microsoft in search, what we call the competing matchmakers problem. Unlike standard coordination games where players are typically treated symmetrically, the competing matchmakers problem introduces additional complexity owing to the fact that participants may fundamentally di¤er from one another. For instance, in online auctions, the value of a platform depends not just on how many buyers it attracts, nor how many sellers, but rather on the combination of the two. Moreover, agents of a given type, such as men in an online dating context, care not just about the number of women on the site, but the number of other men as well, since each represents an additional competitor for a woman's heart. These competitive e¤ects multiply the range of equilibrium possibilities. Indeed, in our baseline model, which nests many of the standard models of platform competition, the main conclusion to be derived from equilibrium under full rationality is that anything can happen: A single platform may dominate the market though the model is silent as to which platform or the market may be fragmented though, again, the model is silent as to who gets what share. For managers or regulators looking to theory as a guide, the full rationality model o¤ers little in the way of help as to the correct business strategy to pursue or policy to implement.
However, full rationality represents an idealization at best for what motivates the choices of market participants. There is a growing body of evidence highlighting situations where seemingly inexplicable behavior (under full rationality ) can be readily explained by incorporating limited cognition. One such situation includes behavior in laboratory studies of the famous p-beauty contest game. Unlike most coordination games, full rationality o¤ers a precise prediction for the beauty contest-all subjects will choose the lowest possible action. Actual behavior in various di¤erent settings, however, is wildly at odds with this prediction: There is signi…cant dispersion among choices, and few subjects, if any, select the equilibrium. Relaxing full rationality in favor of a model where players di¤er in their strategic sophistication as suggested by Nagel (1995) , what has now come to be known as the cognitive hierarchies model (Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2004) , nicely organizes the apparent jumble of data. In these models, non-strategic agents naïvely choose a pre-planned action without analyzing the payo¤s. Strategic or sophisticated agents maximize their expected payo¤ given their beliefs which depend on their cognitive sophistication levels.
We begin with a simple observation: If cognitive hierarchy models are useful in organizing data from coordination games in the lab, perhaps these models might be fruitfully used to o¤er guidance in more applied coordination settings, such as the competing matchmakers problem. This analysis is the heart of our study.
An important criticism of bounded rationality models is that they open up a Pandora's box of possibilities where "anything goes" and therefore theory loses much of its predictive power. In our setting, the opposite conclusion obtains-while nearly any market share outcome is consistent with equilibrium under full rationality, cognitive hierarchy models produce unique equilibrium predictions. In some instances, these predictions coincide with a particular equilibrium under full rationality, in which case our models may be thought of as a kind of behavioral equilibrium re…nement. In other settings, the predictions are completely novel. Thus, in addition to o¤ering more precise predictions, these models are, in principle, empirically distinguishable from their fully rational counterparts.
Before proceeding to describe our main …ndings, a sketch of the setting is useful. There are N men and N women choosing between two online dating platforms. Platforms may di¤er in both the fees they charge and the e¢ cacy of their matching processes. Both platforms share the common feature that there are bene…ts from scale-the larger the participant base at a given platform, the better the expected quality of the resulting matches. This e¤ect pushes the market in the direction of concentration. There is, however, a countervailing competitive force. Men may prefer to be on a smaller platform so as to avoid having to compete as intensely with other men for the attention and a¤ections of the women also located on the larger platform, likewise for women on the smaller platform. Provided that this competitive force is strong enough, platforms of wildly di¤erent sizes can coexist in equilibrium under the fully rational model.
When agents must choose a single platform, as would be the case for a seller of a unique object in an online auction, bounded rationality implies that a dominant platform will emerge. All strategic individuals will coordinate on the same platform-regardless of the strength of competitive e¤ects. The particular platform chosen depends on the behavior of the non-strategic agents. In the case where these agents are totally uninformed about the details of the two platforms and choose randomly, the unique equilibrium prediction is that strategic agents will coordinate on the risk dominant platform, an equilibrium re…nement …rst introduced by Harsanyi and Selten (1988) to select among equilibria in stag hunt type games. Roughly speaking, risk dominance implies that the safer platform, the one that better protects its clients from unexpected choices by others, will prevail. This is true even if the safer platform o¤ers a worse experience than its rival when everyone coordinates on a single platform. The market structure of US online auctions, where eBay is the dominant (and the safest) platform, is consistent with this prediction.
Allowing agents to multi-home (i.e., choose to be on both platforms) adds to the set of equilibrium possibilities under full rationality, but still leads to herding under bounded rationality. Again the exact outcome depends on the choices of the naïve agents. Of particular interest is the situation where these agents simply avoid choosing at all and instead multihome. In that case, strategic agents still coordinate on the single platform, but now select the Pareto dominant rather than the risk dominant choice. In e¤ect, the caution of the naïve players insures the sophisticates against unexpected choices by others. As a consequence, they trade o¤ safety for surplus in coordinating on the more cost-e¤ective platform. Here again bounded rationality acts as a kind of equilibrium re…nement, though importantly the re…nement selected depends on the particulars of the institutional setting.
When naïve agents randomize their behavior, equilibrium takes a di¤erent form: Relatively unsophisticated strategic agents multi-home while sophisticates opt for the Pareto dominant platform exclusively. This equilibrium shares some of the features of credit card markets. While nearly all US credit card holders have a Visa/MasterCard in their wallet, some also carry a Discover card in addition. But the situation is rarely reversed-few people "single home" using Discover. There is no analogous equilibrium under full rationality. Here the boundedly rational model suggests qualitatively di¤erent, and more realistic, behavior.
All of these results suggest that competitive forces alone are not su¢ cient to prevent a dominant platform from emerging. In every case, one of the platforms is accessed by all of the strategic agents (though some may also access a second platform as a kind of backup). While this is a sharp prediction, it is clearly at odds with some market structures arising in real world online markets. For instance, the market for online dating in the US is highly fragmented.
To better understand this phenomenon, we return to the single homing case but now add horizontal di¤erentiation to the mix. Clearly, this provides an additional force allowing both platforms to share the market. Under full rationality, there is an intuitive equilibrium where each agent chooses his or her (horizontally) preferred platform, and the market is split. But there are many other equilibrium possibilities including the emergence of a single dominant platform or a "backwards"equilibrium where every agent chooses her less preferred platform. Relaxing full rationality cuts through the clutter. If naïve agents are weakly more likely to choose their horizontally preferred platform, then the unique equilibrium corresponds to the intuitive case where every agent chooses her (horizontally) preferred platform, and the market is split. The US online dating market is extremely fragmented and horizontally di¤erentiated. Leading sites such as JDate (restricted to Jewish singles), ChristianMingle (restricted to religious Christian singles), and others are all consistent with this emphasis.
Thus the boundedly rational model can account for the variety of market concentrations seen in US platform markets: the dominance of eBay in auctions, the strong-weak division of Visa/MasterCard versus Discover in credit cards, and the severe fragmentation in online dating sites. Moreover, these predictions do not demand that large swaths of the population be naïve. Even arbitrarily small departures from full rationality dramatically sharpen equilibrium predictions in the competing matchmakers problem. The equilibrium multiplicity endemic to coordination games vanishes. More importantly, bounded rationality models highlight the key structural components determining market share. In particular, when platforms are primarily vertically di¤erentiated, it is always the case that one of the platforms is patronized by all agents (though some of these might also visit the rival under multi-homing). This conclusion remains valid regardless of the strength of competitive e¤ects. When platforms are primarily horizontally di¤erentiated, markets are fragmented, even if competitive e¤ects are small or absent altogether.
The model also o¤ers important insights for managers. While the usual business strategy in these markets is to focus mainly on platform quality, our results suggest the critical strategic importance of other considerations. In single-homing contexts, reducing the risk to platform adopters is key: aspects such as 24/7 uptime, backup, and security should be primary considerations. In multi-homing contexts, pricing is critical. The model predicts that a higher quality platform will still falter if it does not pass along enough surplus to its users. Thus, even for successful platforms, monetization at the expense of consumer experience can still lead to grief.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: We conclude this section by placing our results in the context of the extant literature. Section 2 sketches the model. Section 3 characterizes equilibrium in the baseline single-homing model under full and bounded rationality. In section 4, we add multi-homing to the model and explore how this changes choice behavior and market structure. Section 5 adds horizontal di¤erentiation to the model and identi…es conditions where platforms coexist. Section 6 studies a dynamic version of the model and shows that our earlier conclusions are not fundamentally altered by this amendment. Finally, section 7 concludes. Some of the proofs are discussed in the main body of the paper before the formal propositions are presented; the rest are contained in Appendix A.
Related Literature
The literature on platform competition has grown in size and importance with the maturation of the Internet. Early studies (see Katz & Shapiro 1994 for a survey) mainly emphasize the concentrating force of network e¤ects. More recently, Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) as well as Ellison, Fudenberg, and Mobius (2004) highlight the power of competitive e¤ects-competition from agents on the same side of the market-to check network e¤ects and lead to equilibrium coexistence. 1 We relax full rationality and show that the power of competitive e¤ects become greatly attenuated. A separate strand of the literature studies endogenous pricing decisions by platforms. 2 This literature mostly assumes that competitive e¤ects are absent, platforms are horizontally di¤erentiated and consumers single-home. The main …ndings characterize how optimal platform pricing varies with demand elasticities on each side of the market. We contribute to this literature by o¤ering a model where scale, di¤erentiation, and competitive e¤ects are all present and where multi-homing is possible. While we mostly abstract away from optimal pricing decisions, Appendix B studies the case where pricing is endogenous. The empirical literature of platform competition is less well developed. Inspired by David's (1985) in ‡uential study, much of this literature examines the QWERTY phenomenonthe possibility that an interior platform might prevail owing to path dependence. Most studies …nd little evidence of this.
3 Our paper contributes a theoretical rationale for the dearth of QWERTY outcomes.
There is also a small experimental literature on platform competition. In a companion paper, Hossain, Minor, and Morgan (2011) perform laboratory experiments in a single-homing setting using exactly the model outlined below. Unlike the present paper, their main concerns are to use empirical methods to examine the competing predictions of the fully rational model. Moreover, their setting is dynamic-the same group of subjects repeatedly participate in the platform competition game. Their main …ndings are, however, largely consistent with the predictions under cognitive hierarchies. When platforms are primarily vertically di¤erentiated, the market converges to a single platform, which is the same across groups. Despite the presence of multiple equilibria in the fully rational model, there is remarkable consistency in behavior across subjects. When platforms are primarily horizontally di¤er-entiated, the market converse to coexistence where each agent chooses his or her preferred platform.
Ho, Lim, and Camerer (2006) argue that new insights can be gained about …rm strategy and market performance by incorporating consumer psychology into choice models. 4 The framework we use, cognitive hierarchies, draws heavily on Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004), who generalized and expanded upon Nagel's (1995) speci…cation to settings outside the 1 Ambrus and Argenziano (2009) note that consumers must be non-negligible in size for the competitive e¤ects identi…ed in these to papers to have force. 2 See, e.g. Jullien (2001, 2003 beauty contest game. 5 This model has proved extremely useful in organizing lab data across a variety of coordination settings. 6 It has also been used successfully in empirical settings including technology adoption by Internet service providers (Goldfarb and Yang, 2009 ), entry in local telephone markets (Goldfarb and Xiao, 2011) , and decision-making by movie distributors (Brown, Camerer, and Lovallo, 2012a ) and moviegoers (Brown, Camerer, and Lovallo, 2012b) . Ostling et al. (2011) apply this model to study the Swedish lottery game LUPI using both …eld and experimental data. Our paper contributes to this literature by treating the cognitive hierarchy model as an essential tool in applied modeling in more complex settings. The paper also, thus, contributes to the emerging …eld of applying bounded rationality in industrial organization. 7 While the cognitive hierarchies framework might be seen as simply a set of principles for organizing data, it also appears to capture fundamental aspects of primate cognition. In fMRI studies, Bhatt and Camerer (2005) …nd neurological evidence consistent with selfreferential thinking models, including cognitive hierarchies. Dorris and Glimcher (2004) …nd striking similarities between human and monkey behavior in work-shirk games-for both species, shirk rates are consistent with cognitive hierarchies and inconsistent with predictions under full rationality. More broadly, Camerer (2009) o¤ers a survey indicating the mounting evidence for neural underpinnings of behavioral choice models, including our framework.
The Model
Consider a market where there are two competing platforms labeled A and B, serving two types of agents. In terms of exposition, we shall think of these platforms as competing matchmakers and shall refer to the agents as women and men. There are exactly N of each type of agent. The role of the platform is to match agents of one type with agents of the other, i.e., to match men with women. To perform this service, each platform i charges an up-front access fee p i > 0 where i 2 fA; Bg.
All agents simultaneously decide which platform to access. For the moment, we assume that only one of the two platforms may be chosen (i.e., no multi-homing) though we relax this assumption later. We also assume that the bene…ts and fees of the platforms are commonly known and that all agents prefer to participate rather than opting out entirely.
Payo¤s for each agent consist of gross payo¤s from the match technology of the platform less the cost of the access fee. Let u i (n i1 ; n i2 ) denote the gross payo¤ from accessing platform 5 Technically, our model slightly generalizes Camerer, Ho, and Chong by allowing the distribution of cognitive types to be arbitrary rather than Poisson distributed. 6 See, e.g. Stahl and Wilson (1995) i when n i1 agents of the same type and n i2 agents of the opposite type access the platform. For instance, when n i1 women and n i2 men access platform i; then each woman enjoys a gross payo¤ of u i (n i1 ; n i2 ) and a net payo¤ of u i (n i1 ; n i2 ) p i . Similarly, the payo¤s to a man when n i1 men and n i2 women accessed site i would be identical. We focus on the agents'platform choices rather than the strategy of the platforms themselves; thus, we restrict attention to non-discriminatory pricing schemes where the access fee for men and women is the same. Platforms can also charge non-discriminatory fees for a successful match, which are accounted for in the gross payo¤ functions. We assume that platforms exhibit standard competition and network e¤ects. Formally, Assumption 1 (market size e¤ect): Gross payo¤s are increasing in the number of agents of the opposite type. For all n 1 and n 2 , u i (n 1 ; n 2 + 1) > u i (n 1 ; n 2 ).
Assumption 2 (market impact e¤ect): Gross payo¤s are decreasing in the number of agents of own type. For all n 1 and n 2 > 0, u i (n 1 ; n 2 ) > u i (n 1 + 1; n 2 ).
Assumption 3 (positive network externality): Gross payo¤s increase when the number of agents of both types on the platform increase equally. For all n 1 and n 2 , u i (n 1 + 1; n 2 + 1) > u i (n 1 ; n 2 ).
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Assumption 4: For all n 2 f1; 2; : : : ; N g and i 2 fA; Bg, u i (n; 0) = 0: We maintain these assumptions throughout the paper. Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee that women bene…t from a greater choice of men on the platform and su¤er from more competing women (and vice-versa for men.) Assumption 3 guarantees that, all else equal, a larger platform is preferred to a smaller platform. Assumption 4 says that women are una¤ected by competition when there are no men on the platform. We normalize this payo¤ to zero for simplicity. These assumptions do not provide a complete ranking of the gross payo¤s for all possible platform choices by the agents. Indeed, the model is ‡exible enough to accommodate most models of competing platforms in the extant literature.
Finally, to rule out knife-edge or pathological cases, we restrict attention to generic net payo¤s, so that it is not the case that for all i,j 2 fA; Bg and n 1 ; n 2 2 f1; 2; : : : ; N g, u i (n 1 ; n 2 ) p i = u j (n 1 ; n 2 ) p j and assume that access fees are such that agents make positive net payo¤s if all of them coordinate on a single platform, i.e., u i (N; N ) p i > 0.
Equilibrium
We now examine equilibria arising in the model under full rationality, restricting attention to pure strategy Nash equilibria. We then relax this assumption, allowing for di¤erences in the strategic sophistication of agents, using the cognitive hierarchy framework proposed 8 Our results are unchanged if we recast Assumption 3 as multiplicative. Speci…cally, it may be replaced by the assumption that, for all (n 1 ; n 2 ) >> 0; u i (kn 1 ; kn 2 ) > u i (n 1 ; n 2 ) for k > 1.
by Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004). As mentioned above, this model has proved useful in organizing data in a wide array of coordination games and is consistent with neurological evidence regarding choice behavior. Later, we provide a detailed description of how the cognitive hierarchy model works and what aspects of bounded rationality it is meant to capture. Our main result is to show that, while a wide array of market share distributions can arise as equilibria under full rationality, adding even a vanishingly small fraction of strategically unsophisticated agents yields a unique prediction-a single dominant platform is selected by all strategic types.
Full Rationality
We …rst characterize equilibria in the model under the usual assumption of full rationality. Recall that the gender ratio of the market as a whole is 1 to 1. 9 The following lemma shows that in any Nash equilibrium, the gender ratio of agents at each platform is the same as that of the market as a whole. Formally,
Lemma 1
In any Nash equilibrium, the same number of agents of each type select a given platform.
While the result is intuitive for the case where both platforms are identical, Lemma 1 shows that, despite asymmetries across platforms, all equilibria remain symmetric in the sense that the gender ratio is the same across platforms. To see this, suppose more women than men join platform A in equilibrium. This implies that the fee di¤erence p B p A is large enough to o¤set any gain in payo¤ a woman located at platform A would enjoy from switching to the platform B; which has relatively more men. This, however, implies that a man on platform B would bene…t from switching for the same reasons.
The scale e¤ect contained in Assumption 3 implies that these markets are, in a sense, natural monopolies. All else equal, agents bene…t from coordination on a single platform. Formally, we say that the market has tipped when only one platform is active, i.e., all agents opt for a single platform. When both platforms are active, we say that they coexist.
The next proposition shows that tipping is always an equilibrium although it is silent as to which platform will be the "winning" one. To see this, suppose that, in equilibrium, all agents locate on platform i and earn payo¤s u i (N; N ) p i > 0, where the inequality follows by assumption. Now, if an agent deviates to platform j; she earns u j (1; 0) p j < 0 since u j (1; 0) = 0 and p j > 0; therefore such a deviation is not pro…table. It then follows immediately that Proposition 1 Tipping to either platform is an equilibrium. Formally, it is a Nash equilibrium for all agents to select a single platform i 2 fA; Bg.
One might think that something like Assumption 3 is necessary for tipping to comprise a Nash equilibrium. This is not the case. Even if platforms exhibited diseconomies of scale, Proposition 1 would still hold owing to Assumption 4 and the fact that coordinating on a single platform yields non-negative surplus. The reason is that, unlike most standard coordination games, deviations by both types of agents are needed to unlock surplus from the inactive platform.
While Assumption 3 is not necessary for tipping, Assumption 2 is required for coexistence (in a pure strategy equilibrium). To see this, de…ne the magnitude of the market impact e¤ect in market i with n agents of each type to be
Consider an equilibrium where n agents of each type go to platform A with the remainder going to platform B: The di¤erence in equilibrium utility for agents going to platform A versus those going to platform B is
Suppose that U n 0: Clearly, agents located on A cannot pro…tably deviate to B since their payo¤s are less than u B (N n; N n) p B (owing to positive market impact e¤ects): Thus, we only need to show that agents located on B have no wish to deviate. Incentive compatibility requires that
Subtracting u A (n; n) p A from both sides of the inequality, we obtain U n A;n or, equivalently, that market impact e¤ects for platform A must be su¢ ciently large, i.e., A;n U n . The case where U n < 0 yields the analogous condition that the market impact e¤ects for platform B must be su¢ ciently large, i.e., B;N n U n . To summarize, we have shown Proposition 2 Any market share split is consistent with equilibrium provided market impact e¤ects are su¢ ciently large.
Formally, n agents of each type locating on platform A with the remainder choosing platform B comprise a coexisting equilibrium provided that: (1) A;n U n when U n 0 and (2) B ; N n U n when U n < 0.
A di¤erent way to see that market impact e¤ects are necessary for coexisting equilibria to arise is to consider the case where the two platforms are identical. Suppose that platform A enjoys a smaller market share than platform B: In that case, the net payo¤ to men and women located on A is smaller than that enjoyed by their counterparts on B: What prevents a man on A from pro…tably deviating is that, were he to switch, the additional competition among men on B would lower the payo¤s of men on that platform through the market impact e¤ect. If this e¤ect is large enough to overwhelm the gains from scale o¤ered by B; then such a deviation is not pro…table. Essentially, this is the force leading to equilibrium coexistence in the model of Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) .
One might worry that coexisting equilibria arising in this model are "knife-edge" in the sense that any small perturbation in agent strategies leads to tipping. This is not the case. Generically, the coexisting equilibria we identify above are strict Nash equilibria and hence are robust to small perturbations. The following example illustrates how the model works.
Example 1 Suppose the matching technology is such that when a man joins a platform that has at least as many female participants as male participants (including himself), the market impact e¤ect is relatively small. However, when there are fewer females than males on the platform, competition between men becomes more acute leading to a larger market impact e¤ect. A simple gross payo¤ function based on this matching technology can be described by:
and n 1 1. Here, 1 and 2 represent the magnitudes of the market impact e¤ects. This market satis…es all of the assumptions above. Women gain with an increase in the fraction of men located on a given platform. They lose in proportion to the fraction of women on the same platform, and the e¤ect is more pronounced when women on the platform outnumber men. When N = 10, 1 = 0:05, 2 = 0:6, p A = 2 and p B = 0:01, there are …ve coexisting equilibria of this market consisting of equal market shares, a 60-40 split in favor of either platform, and a 70-30 split in favor of either platform. The remaining equilibria consist of tipping to either platform.
Another worry is that coexistence is an artifact of the assumption of exogenous access fees. One might reason that a platform with higher match quality could simply compete Bertrand style in access fees and thereby capture the entire market. The ‡aw in this intuition is that a platform is only valuable to the extent that it can induce multilateral deviations. Regardless of price, it does not pay to switch to a higher quality platform where few other agents are present. In the Appendix, we formalize this intuition and show that coexistence is consistent with equilibrium even when fees are endogenous.
Cognitive Hierarchy
The previous analysis relied on the full rationality of market participants. In particular, the choices made by each agent depend on expectations about the choices made by all other agents, which in turn depend on expectations of expectations, and so on. Clearly, this level of sophistication is an idealization at best-some participants are likely to be more naïve and make choices without fully re ‡ecting on the selections of other agents. To capture this idea, we use a model of cognitive hierarchies. Cognitive hierarchy models are meant to capture heterogeneities in the strategic sophistication of participants in the market. Speci…cally, some fraction of agents are non-strategic. Their choices are determined by rules or heuristics and made irrespective of beliefs about the choices of others. Other agents have limited strategic reasoning. Their expectations are formed based on ( ‡awed) models of the choice behavior of all other agents.
Formally, each agent has a cognitive sophistication level of l 2 0; : : : ; L . For simplicity, we assume that the true distribution of the levels of cognitive sophistication is the same for women and men. An agent is of cognitive sophistication level l with probability f (l) > 0 where
Note that we impose no additional structure on f . As such, our results hold for a broad class of distributions including the normalized Poisson (with any …nite value of its parameter ), which has frequently been used to analyze experimental data.
Level-0 agents are non-strategic. They make no inference about the behavior of others around them to determine the correct choice and instead rely on rules or heuristics to guide their choices. Rather than imposing a speci…c heuristic for these types, we remain agnostic about their strategy and assume that these agents choose platform A with probability A 2 [0; 1] and platform B with probability B = 1
A . Agents of level k 1 believe that all others have sophistication levels strictly below k and best respond accordingly. Formally, a level-k woman assumes that all N men and the remaining N 1 women are of level k 1 or below. Moreover, she perceives that the population fraction of level l is f (l) = P k 1 t=0 f (t) for l k 1 and is 0 for l k. A level-k man has analogous beliefs about others. Even though these agents are strategic, their beliefs about the strategic sophistication of the population are incorrect, instead re ‡ecting a form of overcon…dence. Each agent perceives that he or she is more strategically sophisticated than others making choices.
To analyze the game, the following notation proves helpful: Let U i ( ) denote the expected gross payo¤ to an agent from choosing platform i when all other agents independently select this platform with probability : That is,
Clearly, 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 payo¤s. To ensure that payo¤s satisfy the familiar single-crossing condition with respect to ; it su¢ ces to ensure that the payo¤s for each platform are single-peaked in . Formally,
Assumption 5 guarantees that there is a unique solving
Moreover, for all 0 > ;
for i 2 fA; Bg, which are the usual single-crossing conditions. With this notation in hand, let us consider the best responses for each agent. From the perspective of a level-1 agent, all other agents are selecting platforms at random, thus, her expected payo¤ from choosing platform i is simply
10 Naturally, such an agent chooses platform i over j if and only if
Level-1 agents choose platform i provided there is a su¢ ciently high chance of encountering level-0 agents there. A level-2 agent believes that all other agents go to platform i with probability
> i as she believes all other agents are of level 0 or 1. That is, she believes a larger fraction of agents are choosing platform i than does a level-1 agent. The single-crossing property implies that she too prefers platform i to j: (Notice that absent Assumption 5, one might encounter the rather implausible situation where an agent who is convinced that platform i enjoys a higher market share is less likely to choose it compared to an agent who believes that i enjoys a smaller market share.) The same logic obtains for agents with ever higher levels of sophistication. As a consequence, the market will tip to the platform satisfying equation (2) . Formally, Proposition 3 Under cognitive hierarchy, all agents with sophistication level l > 1 choose the same platform as level-1 agents. Level-1 agents choose the platform i satisfying equation
Like many models with behavioral types, the choices of level-0 types profoundly in ‡uence the decisions of more sophisticated agents, even when level-0 agents are relatively scarce in the population as a whole. Of particular interest is the situation where level-0 agents choose either platform with equal probability, i.e. i = 1 2 . In that case, there is a useful link between cognitive hierarchy and the risk dominance notion of equilibrium selection …rst 10 We ignore the non-generic case where i happens to leave level-1 types indi¤erent between the two platforms. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 introduced by Harsanyi and Selten (1988) . Harsanyi and Selten were motivated by the game stag hunt. It is well-known that there are two pure strategy equilibria in stag hunt, one corresponding to the "safe" strategy of hunting hare and the other corresponding to the "risky"strategy of hunting stag. Of course, in equilibrium, neither strategy is truly risky in that the behavior of the others is perfectly anticipated. Yet, in a real sense, hunting stag is riskier-an agent's payo¤ could be lower if the other player chose an unexpected action. Harsanyi and Selten sought to capture this notion through the risk dominance equilibrium re…nement. Speci…cally, given two pure equilibria, E and E 0 of a bi-matrix game, equilibrium E is said to be risk dominant if the expected payo¤ to each agent is higher under E than under E 0 given random (equiprobable) play on the part of others. So long as the downside of hunting stag is su¢ ciently large, hunting hare is the risk dominant equilibrium in the game. The same holds true in our setting and hence:
and f (0) ! 0; then the unique equilibrium under cognitive hierarchy converges to the risk dominant equilibrium.
While the cognitive hierarchy outcome corresponds to risk dominance under the speci…c assumption of equiprobable choice behavior by level-0 agents, the model predicts herdingall more sophisticated agents will mimic the choices of level-1 agents-regardless of the particular speci…cation of level-0 behavior. Indeed, this herding phenomenon is quite robust. While we derived the herding e¤ect using the Camerer-Ho-Chong speci…cation of beliefs in the cognitive hierarchy model, this property is shared by all other speci…cations used in this literature. For instance, in the Nagel-Stahl-Wilson speci…cation, a level-k agent believes that all other agents have cognitive sophistication level of k 1. Obviously, the behavior of level 1 agents is unchanged under this speci…cation. Naturally, all other cognitive types will choose the same platform as level-1 agents. Indeed, Assumption 5 is no longer needed for this speci…cation of beliefs.
Notice also that the results are independent of the distribution of strategic types. Even if level-0 types are rare, strategic agents (who in past laboratory studies accounted for most of the population) choose the risk dominant platform. The herding result is also robust to relaxing the assumption that the gross payo¤s treat men and women symmetrically. So long as the expected payo¤ maximizing platform is the same for both types of agents, the cognitive hierarchy model will again predict a unique equilibrium where all agents will herd on the choice of the level-1 agents. Likewise, the result straightforwardly extends to the case where there are more than two competing platforms.
From a managerial perspective, this suggests that an emphasis on safety is called for as agents are likely to choose the safer platform over a high-return but high-variance platform. This is illustrated in activities of several major platforms. For instance, eBay implemented 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 a number of policies to protect sellers and buyers against non-performance by the counterparty. Microsoft emphasizes the security of its operating systems (albeit with mixed results). Facebook likewise emphasizes data security, privacy, and 24/7 uptime.
Multi-Homing
The previous section follows much of the literature on platform competition by restricting agents to choose a single platform. In practice, however, there are many circumstances where such an assumption is patently unrealistic. For instance, if one were interested in applying the model to study credit card markets, assuming that merchants only accept a single type of card or that consumers only have one card in their wallets is clearly at odds with reality. One reason for restricting attention to the single-homing case is tractability. As we saw, equilibrium multiplicity was a serious problem in the fully rational model even under singlehoming. The analysis only grows more complex with the addition of multi-homing. A second reason for such a restriction is that the single-homing assumption might be innocuous-the analysis may be fundamentally unchanged despite the added complexity.
In this section, we amend the model to allow for multi-homing. Formally, each agent's choice set now consists of fA; B; ABg where AB denotes subscribing to both platforms. We show that, in the fully rational case, this additional option is not innocuous-the set of coexisting equilibria change when multi-homing is permitted. However, this added complexity does not change the simplicity of the cognitive hierarchy approach. There remains a unique equilibrium, but the character of the equilibrium does change. In particular, even when level-0 agents choose each available option with equal probability, it is no longer the case that the risk dominant platform prevails in the market. Indeed, the addition of multi-homing tends to favor the "better"platform in the sense of Pareto dominance. Thus, the assumption of single-homing is a meaningful restriction, regardless of the assumed level of rationality.
Assumptions 1-4 imply that one of the platforms will be Pareto dominant-payo¤s for all participants are maximized when everyone chooses this platform exclusively. Let platform i denote the Pareto dominant platform, and note that this implies that
Amending the model to allow for multi-homing requires more than merely adding this option to the choice sets of each agent. It also requires some speci…cation of how the matching process works (and hence payo¤s are generated) when agents choose to multi-home. We assume that agents follow a lexicographic rule: First, they go to the better (Pareto dominant) platform and enjoy payo¤s from whoever else is at that platform. That is, an agent enjoys payo¤s u i (n i1 ; n i2 ) p i . Next, they go to the worse platform and enjoy payo¤s from any new individuals of the opposite type they encounter. Of course, they still su¤er costs from 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 competition associated with all individuals of the same type visiting the worse platform. That is, an agent who multi-homes enjoys incremental payo¤s of u j n j1 ; n E j2 p j where n E j2 = N n i2 .
11 Thus, the net payo¤ for a multi-homing agent is
This type of rule is intuitive in a dating market context. It makes sense that a woman will …rst search for matches on the better dating platform, collecting contact information for the attractive men located there. Having obtained this information, she then visits the less attractive dating platform. Obviously, the only additional value such a visit provides is the contact information for new attractive men not already encountered on the better platform. Of course, she faces competition from all of the women located at each platform regardless of duplication. 12 Full Rationality Tipping to either platform remains an equilibrium even when we add the option of multihoming. To see, this, suppose women all choose platform i 2 fA; Bg exclusively, then men have no incentive to join platform j or to multi-home since there is no bene…t to visiting a platform which is devoid of women. The same is true of women when men join platform i exclusively.
Likewise, under some parameter values, it remains an equilibrium for n agents of each type join platform A and the remaining N n agents of each type join platform B, the analog to coexisting equilibria under single homing. Proposition 4 formalizes this.
Proposition 4 When agents can multi-home, tipping to either platform is an equilibrium. Furthermore, any market share split is consistent with equilibrium provided market impact e¤ects are su¢ ciently large.
Formally, there exists an equilibrium where all agents choose platform i 2 fA; Bg : There exists an equilibrium where n agents of each type choose platform i 2 fA; Bg with the remainder choosing platform j provided that:
Since the multi-homing option is not exercised for the coexisting equilibria characterized in Proposition 4, we can examine how multi-homing a¤ects the chance that platforms coexist. De…ne M H A;n u A (n; n) p A to be the critical threshold for market impact e¤ects on platform 11 The superscript E is a mnemonic for the extra agents of the other type encountered at platform j. 12 While this rule seems intuitive, it is not required for our main result (Proposition 6)-that under cognitive hierarchy the better platform prevails. The result would still hold if we instead assumed that all agents visited the worse platform …rst.
A to sustain coexistence in an equilibrium where n agents choose platform A under multihoming. That is, the market impact e¤ect, A;n must be M H A;n or more for this con…guration to be an equilibrium. Under single-homing, the relevant critical threshold is SH A;n U n . The critical thresholds for the market impact e¤ects on platform B are analogous. Now, since u B (N n; N n) p B 0; it follows immediately that M H A;n SH A;n and similarly M H B;n SH B;n -market impact e¤ects must be larger to sustain coexistence under multihoming than under single-homing. The option to multi-home undermines the prospects of equilibrium coexistence (for the class of equilibria where the multi-homing option is not exercised). This is intuitive in that multi-homing o¤ers an additional possibility for deviation from equilibrium, namely collocating on both platforms. The required conditions to rule such deviations out are, accordingly, more stringent.
Of course, Proposition 4 only considers the set of equilibria in which the option to multihome is not exercised. Equilibrium coexistence might also arise when it is an equilibrium for one or both types of agents to multi-home. One can easily rule out the possibility that all agents multi-home. To see this, notice that, since all women are on both platforms, there is no incremental bene…t to men from visiting the worse platform. Moreover, such visits are costly. Hence, men can pro…tably deviate by single-homing at the better platform and likewise for women. Similarly, it can never be an equilibrium for all men to choose platform i and some men to multi-home. Under this circumstance, all women would choose to visit platform i exclusively and hence the multi-homing men derive no bene…t from also accessing platform j: (An identical argument rules out the case where all women visit platform i and some multi-home.)
There are, however, coexisting equilibria where some agents of each type exclusively use each of the platforms while others multi-home. For instance, some men exclusively use platform A, others exclusively use platform B, while the remainder multi-home and symmetrically for the women. Since some men …nd it optimal to multi-home, one may wonder why it is not pro…table for a man currently using a single platform to deviate by multi-homing. What prevents this is the market impact e¤ect-by adding a second platform, competition among men on this platform is increased-which deters such deviations. Proposition 5 formalizes the exact conditions where the market impact e¤ects can sustain this type of coexistence.
Proposition 5 Provided market impact e¤ects are su¢ ciently large, coexistence where some agents multi-home is an equilibrium.
Formally, suppose that A is the Pareto dominant platform and that
Then it is a Nash equilibrium for N n B agents of each type locate only on platform A, N n A agents of each type locate only on platform B, and n A + n B N agents of each type multi-home.
Proposition 5 reveals that the multi-homing behavior seen in practice in credit card markets is consistent with a coexisting equilibrium under full rationality. Moreover, it is essential that not all individuals on the same side of the market make the same choice. Some consumers will use Visa/MasterCard exclusively while others will also carry Discover card. Likewise, not all merchants will accept both cards. One counterfactual aspect of the equilibrium is that it requires that some merchants and some consumers use/accept Discover card exclusively. While the exclusive acceptance of Discover was, at one time, the policy of both Sears and Sam's Club, this is no longer the case. Thus, a coexisting equilibrium is capable of rationalizing some but not all behavior with respect to multi-homing. Perhaps more importantly, such equilibria are ruled out (by assumption) by limiting attention to the single-homing case.
Taken together, Propositions 4 and 5 point out that equilibrium still o¤ers little guidance as to what market structures emerge with platform competition under full rationality and multi-homing. Indeed, if anything, the picture is even more muddled than under single homing. For instance, one can easily choose parameter values such that the addition of multi-homing merely expands the (already considerable) set of equilibria that previously arose under single homing.
Cognitive Hierarchy
We saw that relaxing the assumption of full rationality in favor of the arguably more realistic cognitive hierarchy formulation substantially clari…ed predictions about market structure under single-homing regardless of the assumptions made about the behavior of level-0 agents. Multi-homing introduces additional possibilities for modeling the choices made by these individuals. Now the probabilistic mix is multi-dimensional rather than single dimensional. Assuming single peakedness (Assumption 5) guaranteed that the problem of best responses for level 1 and higher agents was well-behaved thus facilitating full characterization under single-homing. The situation is more nuanced in the multi-homing case. Thus, rather than characterizing equilibria under arbitrary choices of level-0 agents, we temporarily restrict attention to circumstances where these choices are in pure strategies. Later, we relax this assumption to allow for symmetric randomization behavior by these agents; that is, level-0 agents (stochastically) choose either of the platforms with equal probability and otherwise multi-home.
Pure Strategy Choices by Level-0 Agents Consider the case where level-0 agents avoid choosing between competing platforms; they simply multi-home. We claim that all strategically sophisticated agents choose the better platform. When level-0 agents multi-home, level-1 agents, who view all agents as being level-0, believe that everyone will be present on both platforms. There is, e¤ectively, no risk associated with choosing either platform and, as a consequence, level-1 agents select the better (i.e. Pareto dominant) platform. A level-2 agent believes that all agents are level-1 or level-0 and hence believes that all agents will be present on the Pareto dominant platform. As a consequence, such agents are best served by mimicking the choices of the level-1 agents. The same holds of all agents with higher levels of strategic sophistication. Formally, we may conclude:
Proposition 6
Suppose that all level-0 agents multi-home. Under cognitive hierarchy, all agents with sophistication level l 1 choose the Pareto dominant platform.
Proposition 6 reinforces the notion that, by allowing for some degree of bounded rationality, market impact e¤ects are not enough to sustain equilibrium coexistence-one of the platforms will enjoy 100% market share of sophisticated agents while the rival platform gets 0% market share. Moreover, it sharpens the prediction as to the identity of the winning platform. In particular, it suggests that the QWERTY phenomenon-the possibility of agents getting locked in to the inferior platform-does not arise. Put di¤erently, lock-in at the inferior platform does not arise despite the hyper-sophistication assumed in the fully rational model, but rather relies upon this sophistication in an essential way. It is perhaps for this reason that examples of this type of lock-in are rare.
Next, consider the case where all level-0 agents choose platform i exclusively. Clearly level-1 agents will follow suit. There is no gain to accessing platform j either exclusively or through multi-homing since no agents are believed to be present on the platform. The same logic applies to all agents with higher levels of sophistication. Thus, we have shown that Proposition 7 Suppose that all level-0 agents choose platform i. Then, under cognitive hierarchy, the market tips to platform i-all agents utilize this platform exclusively.
Propositions 6 and 7 highlight several key properties of bounded rationality and platform competition. First, the "herding" e¤ect where all agents of higher levels of sophistication mimic the choices of level-1 agents is a robust feature of the model. Second, despite the option to multi-home, all agents of higher levels of sophistication opt for a single platform. Third, and most importantly, even in the presence of multi-homing, a single dominant platform emerges as the equilibrium market structure.
Stochastic Level-0 Agent Choices One may worry, however, that the tendency toward tipping is purely an artifact of our restriction to pure strategy behavior on the part of level-0 agents. We now partially relax this assumption to allow for non-deterministic behavior on their part. Speci…cally, we assume that level-0 agents choose to access platform i exclusively with the same probability as platform j: With remaining probability, level-0 agents multi-home.
Before proceeding with the analysis, we need to introduce some additional notation to account for stochastic choices on the part of other agents. As usual, let i be the Pareto dominant platform. Suppose that an agent of a given level of rationality believes that all other agents select platform i (exclusively) with probability i ; select platform j with probability j ; and multi-home with the remaining probability 1 i j . In that case, her payo¤ from multi-homing when exactly s 1 agents of the same type choose i, r multi-home, and t of the opposite type choose platform i (either exclusively or through multi-homing) is simply (u i (s + r; t) + u j (N s + 1; N t)) : The probability of this event happening is 
:
Summing over all possible events yields the expected utility from multi-homing,
Pr[s; r; t] (u i (s + r; t) + u j (N s + 1; N t)) :
When an agent chooses platform i exclusively, on the other hand, she gets payo¤ from all other agents who join platform i, exclusively or not. That is, she believes that an agent will locate on platform i with probability 1 j : Therefore, her expected payo¤ from joining platform i exclusively is
While the delineation of i and j is needed in determining the payo¤s under multi-homing, it is not strictly necessary under single homing. Indeed, U sh;i ( i ; j ) = U i (1 j ) as de…ned in equation (1) . Similarly, when an agent chooses platform j exclusively, she earns 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 Each of these functions is well-de…ned and continuously di¤erentiable in i and j . The case where i = j = 0 corresponds to the situation where all other agents are perceived to multi-home. As we saw in the proof of Proposition 6, an agent's best response was to select the better platform exclusively given these beliefs. That is,
For multi-homing to be a viable best response to symmetric choices by level-0 agents, we assume that
This assumption merely guarantees that, if all other agents single home with equal probability for each platform, then the bene…ts of encountering all of the agents of the opposite type exceed the costs of multi-homing. Finally, the analysis is greatly simpli…ed if we extend the notion of Pareto dominance to situations where platforms enjoy less than 100% market share. Speci…cally, we say that platform i is super dominant if, for a given market share, payo¤s are higher on platform i than on platform j: For instance, were j to enjoy 60% market share, then payo¤s to those on platform j would be lower than to agents on platform i when i enjoys this same market share. Formally, we assume that, for all ;
Obviously, super dominance implies Pareto dominance.
As for the single-homing case, we require some additional structure to ensure that the expected payo¤ functions are well-behaved. Analogous to Assumption 5, we assume that U mh ( ; ) is single-peaked in . Moreover, we assume that relative attractiveness of multihoming over single-homing at platform i is decreasing in the probability of an agent choosing platform i and is increasing in the probability of an agent choosing platform j. Note that Assumption 5 already implies that U sh;i ( i ; j ) is single-peaked in j . Formally,
is decreasing in i and increasing in j :
With these assumptions, we can now analyze the behavior of level-1 agents. Let i = j =~ denote the choice probabilities of level-0 agents. Clearly, if~ is small, then the best response for a level-1 agent is to single-home, exclusively choosing the super dominant platform. This follows from continuity and the inequality in equation (4) . Similarly, if~ is close to 50%, then the best response for a level-1 agents is to multi-home, which follows from continuity and the inequality in equation (5). Thus, there exists for intermediate probability, 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 59 60 ~ = ; where level-1 agents are exactly indi¤erent between single and multi-homing. Clearly, level-1 agents multi-home if and only if~ . 13 When~ < ; level-1 agents choose the super dominant platform. Naturally, this makes this platform more attractive for higher level agents, and we obtain the familiar herding result-more sophisticated agents mimic the behavior of level-1 agents and choose the super dominant platform exclusively.
Of greater interest is the case where~ . Here, level-1 agents choose to multi-home and thus, from the perspective of a level-2 agent, the fraction of other agents choosing to be exclusively on platform i or j falls to 0 < : As a consequence, multi-homing is now less attractive. Eventually, there exists a level-k agent for whom 0 has fallen su¢ ciently that it is now below the critical threshold, . This agent then chooses to visit the super-dominant platform exclusively and, as usual, all more sophisticated agents follow suit. While the above sketches the essence of the proof, it omits a number of technical details needed to ensure that the intuitive behavior described above is, indeed, optimal. Proposition 8 presents a formal statement of the result. The detailed proof is contained in Appendix A.
Proposition 8 Suppose Assumptions 1-6 hold. Then, under cognitive hierarchy:
If level-0 agents single-home on each platform with probability~ < ; all strategically sophisticated agents choose the super-dominant platform.
If level-0 agents single-home on each platform with probability~ ; then there exists 1 > k > 1 such that all agents of sophistication levels f1; 2; :::; k 1g multi-home while more sophisticated agents choose the super-dominant platform.
Proposition 8 highlights that the addition of multi-homing o¤ers the possibility of a much richer set of choice behavior in equilibrium under cognitive hierarchy. While it remains the case that bounded rationality leads to unique predictions that entail herding behavior where more sophisticated agents mimic the choices of less sophisticated agents, it is no longer the case that there is a single, dominant platform selected by sophisticated agents. When the fraction of level-0 agents who single-home is high enough, relatively less sophisticated strategic agents respond by multi-homing while sophisticates choose the better platform exclusively. This behavior is qualitatively consistent with what one sees in the credit card market-some people carry Visa/MasterCard and Discover in their wallet while others use Visa/MasterCard exclusively. Likewise for merchants-Discover cards are not universally accepted while Visa/MasterCards are. It is also unlike any equilibrium under full rationality. Thus, in principle, the distinction between the two models is empirically testable. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 More broadly, in multi-homing contexts, value is the key. This has led to a bene…ts war in credit card markets where competitors vie to provide consumers with rewards such as cash back, airline miles, and so on to induce them to use a particular card. Likewise, interest rate cuts and fee waivers are used to entice customers to switch away from rivals. Similarly, in search engines Google is ubiquitous; however for some queries, particularly those related to shopping for a particular product, some individuals will multi-home, using both Google and Amazon. Even though search engines are free to consumers, there is a constant battle over quality. For instance, Microsoft's search engine Bing distinguished itself with faster incorporation of social data, such as Twitter feeds, into its search results. It also, for a time, paid consumers to use its engine for queries.
Horizontal Di¤erentiation
While models with full rationality o¤ered little in the way of predictions about market structure, bounded rationality models o¤ered more precise predictions. Speci…cally, regardless of the size of market impact e¤ects, vertical di¤erentiation, or single versus multi-homing, a ubiquitous platform always arose in equilibrium. Under single-homing, this implied that there was a single, dominant platform selected by all strategic agents. Under multi-homing, both platforms might coexist, but one of the platforms would be "universal" in the sense that all sophisticated agents chose it either exclusively or through multi-homing. While this matches many platform competition situations where there is a single big agent, in other situations the market is more fragmented. In this section, we enrich the model to account for di¤erences in individual preferences across platforms, i.e. to permit horizontal as well as vertical di¤erentiation across platforms.
Up until now, we have assumed that the payo¤s for all individuals of a given type choosing a given platform were the same. Thus, while players might view the platforms Match.com and eHarmony as di¤erent, all men and women feel the same way about each platform. Clearly, this is an unrealistic assumption. One key dimension along which Match and eHarmony di¤er is whether the user browses to …nd the right match versus whether the site provides the user with a short list of suitable matches. A user visiting Match.com can browse the pro…les of all others signed up to the site and decide who to contact. Browsing, however, is not permitted on eHarmony. Instead, the user receives a list of a small set of potential matches based on compatibility algorithms at the website. Some users prefer the do it yourself approach of Match while others prefer the top-down approach of eHarmony.
To model this, we suppose that each agent has a horizontally preferred platform. By choosing the preferred platform, the agent receives a discount of > 0 o¤ of the access fee. Suppose platform i is a given man's preferred platform where n 1 1 other men and 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 n 2 women has joined and the remaining men and women have joined his non-preferred platform j. Then his payo¤ from joining platforms i and j will be u i (n 1 ; n 2 ) p i + and u j (N n 1 + 1; N n 2 ) p j , respectively. The model is uninteresting when the discount is so large as to induce the agent to go to his preferred platform even when he or she is alone on the platform. Thus, we assume that if platform i is the preferred platform then
Suppose f n A men and f n A women have a preference for platform A and f n B = N f n A agents of each type have a preference for platform B. To examine the pure e¤ect of horizontal di¤erentiation, we revert to the case where only single-homing is allowed.
Full Rationality
We do not characterize all equilibria for this model. However, we show that both tipping and coexistence occur in equilibrium. Importantly, adding horizontal di¤erentiation admits a new possibility-for generic parameter values, it may be that neither platform is Pareto dominant. Pareto dominance requires that horizontal di¤erentiation be relatively unimportant. Formally, a Pareto dominant platform exists if and only if
for some i. It may be readily veri…ed that the inequality given in equation (7) is more stringent than that given in equation (6) . Thus, the model covers parameter values where horizontal di¤erentiation is small, so a Pareto dominant platform exists, or large, so it does not. Regardless of whether the inequality in equation (7) holds, tipping to either platform remains an equilibrium. If all agents are located on platform i, even an agent whose preferred platform is j cannot bene…t from unilaterally switching to platform j given the upper bound on as speci…ed in equation (6) . Thus, we have shown Proposition 9 Under horizontal di¤erentiation, tipping to either platform is a Nash equilibrium.
Under horizontal di¤erentiation, coexisting equilibria continue to exist. The most intuitive of these is one where each agent goes to her (horizontally) preferred platform; however, there are many other classes of equilibria where platforms coexist. For instance, for some parameter values (shown formally below) it is an equilibrium for everyone to choose their non-preferred platform. A mixture, where some agents choose their preferred platform and others their non-preferred, is also possible. As usual, the key to equilibrium coexistence is the size of market impact e¤ects. For the intuitive equilibrium, the magnitude of the required e¤ect is reduced by the discount : It is raised by this same amount for the "backwards" equilibrium. The following proposition derives formal conditions on market impact e¤ects for equilibrium coexistence to arise. The broader point is that adding horizontal di¤eren-tiation merely exacerbates the equilibrium multiplicity already present under the baseline model where horizontal di¤erentiation is absent. Formally, Proposition 10 Platform coexistence is consistent with equilibrium under horizontal di¤er-entiation provided that market impact e¤ects are large enough. Speci…cally, I. All agents joining their preferred platforms is a coexisting equilibrium if (1) A; f
II. All agents joining their non-preferred platform is a coexisting equilibrium if
n A m pairs of men and women choosing their preferred platform A, m pairs of men and women choosing their non-preferred platform B and f n B pairs of men and women agents choosing their preferred platform B for some m 2 f1; 2; : : : ; f n A 1g is an equilibrium if A; f
We can illustrate multiple coexisting equilibria under horizontal di¤erentiation using Example 1 with the additional assumptions that f n A = f n B = 5 and = 10. Equal market shares for both platforms as well as 60-40 and 70-30 splits in favor of either platform constitute coexisting equilibria. Within these market share splits, any combination of agents choosing their preferred or non-preferred platforms constitute an equilibrium. Moreover, an 80-20 split in favor of either platform where two pairs of men and women choose their preferred platform and all other agents choose the other platform (which is the preferred platform for …ve men and …ve women located there) is an equilibrium. In this example, the possible set of coexisting equilibria under horizontal di¤erentiation is strictly larger than that of the baseline model. 14 To summarize, adding horizontal di¤erentiation to the single-homing model under full rationality does little to clarify predictions about market structures or o¤er insights about business strategies. Depending on the type of equilibrium, market impact e¤ects and horizontal di¤erentiation can interact in peculiar ways. In a coexisting equilibrium where agents choose their preferred platform, horizontal di¤erentiation aids in sustaining coexistence whereas in an equilibrium where agents choose non-preferred platform, market impact e¤ects must be especially strong to overcome horizontal di¤erentiation. Regardless, equilibrium coexistence is by no means assured-tipping remains an equilibrium.
Cognitive Hierarchy Once again we relax the full rationality assumption. Our main result in this section is to show that the cognitive hierarchy model predicts a unique outcome-provided horizontal di¤erentiation is su¢ ciently important, each strategic agent chooses her preferred platform and hence both platforms coexist in equilibrium.
While we were agnostic about the behavior of level-0 agents when horizontal di¤erentia-tion was absent, here we place some (mild) additional structure on their choices: We assume that level-0 agents are weakly more likely to choose their preferred platform than their nonpreferred platform. This rules out bizarre cases where being horizontally preferred reduces the chance that a platform is selected by a non-strategic agent.
The interesting case arises when the degree of horizontal di¤erentiation ( ) is relatively large. Our baseline model is, in e¤ect a special case of the horizontal di¤erentiation model where = 0. As we showed, in that case a single, dominant platform is chosen by all strategic agents. By continuity, if is small, this continues to be the case. The interesting situation arises when:
Assumption 7: > U j 1 min
(p i p j ) for i 2 fA; Bg. Assumption 7 is fairly weak. Among other things, it merely ensures that when the choices of all other agents are random, it is better for an agent to choose her preferred platform over the non-preferred platform. With this assumption, we are now in a position to state our main result of this section:
Proposition 11 When horizontal di¤erentiation is su¢ ciently large, platforms coexist under cognitive hierarchy.
Formally, suppose level-0 agents weakly choose their preferred platform and Assumptions 1-5, and 7 hold. Then strategically sophisticated agents choose their preferred platform in the unique equilibrium.
We sketch the proof below, but leave the formal analysis to Appendix A. When level-1 agents are determining which platform to select, they anticipate that level-0 agents are weakly more likely to choose their preferred platform. Notice that, even when level-0 agents are selecting randomly, Assumption 7 implies that level-1 agents optimally select their preferred platform. Likewise, when level-0 agents are always selecting their preferred platform, level-1 agents …nd it optimal to do so as well (since this is a Nash equilibrium under full rationality). Assumption 5 guarantees that, for any convex combination of these two extremes, it remains optimal for level-1 agents to choose their preferred platform. Level-2 agents likewise face a convex combination of random choice and selection based on preferred platforms and respond identically to level-1 agents. And so on for more sophisticated agents.
Comparing Propositions 3 and 11 reveals striking di¤erences in market structure under bounded rationality. When horizontal di¤erentiation is only a secondary consideration, there is a strong tendency toward industry concentration-all strategic agents choose the same platform regardless of market impact e¤ects. Once horizontal di¤erentiation becomes an important consideration, the industry tends to remain fragmented regardless of the magnitude of positive network externalities. Thus, the cognitive hierarchy model is capable of rationalizing the vast di¤erence in the market structure of online auctions (extremely concentrated) and online dating markets (extremely fragmented). While the technology used by platforms in both of these markets is similar, idiosyncratic match characteristics (horizontal di¤erentiation) are much more important in selecting a date or a life partner than they are in selecting a Beanie Baby or a new golf club. Di¤erences in the market structure for video game consoles (fragmented) versus o¢ ce software and high de…nition optical disc format (concentrated) can also be explained along the same lines. From a managerial perspective, this suggests that emphasizing the unique identity of culture of users of a given platform can be a more successful marketing strategy than one that emphasizes the quality of the matchmaking process or the value of the site.
The results of laboratory studies o¤er formal evidence supporting the predictions of the cognitive hierarchy model. Hossain, Minor, and Morgan (2011) examine the dynamics of platform competition under single homing, varying the degree of horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation, as well as the strength of competitive e¤ects. When horizontal di¤erentiation is small or absent altogether, they …nd strong evidence in favor of market tipping toward the risk dominant platform (regardless of competitive e¤ects). 15 When horizontal di¤erentiation is strong, platform coexistence emerges with agents choosing their preferred platform.
Market Dynamics
Our model follows much of the extant literature in treating platform competition as a simultaneous game. Yet, for many online markets, perhaps the most signi…cant feature of the business landscape has been the phenomenal growth in the number of users. In this section, we extend the baseline model to allow for rudimentary market dynamics. Speci…cally, we divide the platform competition game into two stages-an initial stage marked by a small number of users, followed by a maturation stage with a larger in ‡ux of new users. Payo¤s for all users are realized following the maturation stage. A standard intuition is that markets with network e¤ects, such as those that we study, exhibit strong path dependence-platform choices at the initial stage dictate the winning and losing platform as the market matures. In a sense, the herding by sophisticated types under cognitive hierarchies has some of the ‡avor of this agglomeration dynamic. As we will show, however, such forces carry no particular weight under full rationality. Indeed, our main result in this section is that the "anything goes" feature of the baseline model under full rationality carries through almost entirely in a dynamic setting, even when all agents coordinate on a single platform in the initial stage.
The formal model is as follows: During the initial stage d 2 1; 2; :::;
agents of each type simultaneously select a platform. 16 At the maturation stage, their choices are revealed to all the remaining agents. These N d pairs of agents then simultaneously make platform choices. The timing of moves is exogenously speci…ed; thus, an agent cannot choose to wait or go early. At the conclusion of the game, payo¤s for all agents are determined based on the total number of agents of each type attracted to each platform exactly as speci…ed previously. Throughout both periods, prices, match e¢ ciency, and access fees for each platform remain …xed; thus, the model rules out penetration pricing or other time varying strategies by platforms. This is done to allow a direct comparison to the simultaneous game, but is, admittedly, not a realistic feature. The situation we have in mind is where d is small relative to N although the analysis requires no such restriction in that regard.
Full Rationality As usual, we restrict attention to pure strategy equilibrium though subgame perfection obliges us to admit mixed strategies o¤ the equilibrium path. We begin by establishing the analog of Lemma 1 for the sequential version of the model.
Lemma 2
In any subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential game, the same number of agents of each type select a given platform.
Lemma 2 considerably simpli…es the equilibrium characterization. We are now in a position to report the main result of this section.
Proposition 12
Fix a gross payo¤ function and suppose that n (resp. N n) agents of each type subscribe to platform A (resp. B):
(1)Then there exists a pair of access fees (p A ; p B ) such that these market shares comprise an equilibrium of both the sequential and simultaneous games.
(2) Furthermore, for any pair of access fees, if these market shares comprise a subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential game, they also form a Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game.
Proposition 12 highlights that equilibrium multiplicity under full rationality is as problematic in the sequential game as in the simultaneous game. The proof of part 1 of the proposition is by construction. The idea is as follows: choose access fees such that the market impact e¤ect is large enough to sustain a market where n pairs of agents choose 16 Here we assume N to be even. For odd N , we can assume that d platform A with the remainder choosing B. This ensures that these market shares arise in a Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game. To ensure subgame perfection requires the additional condition that the market share of the platform producing higher equilibrium payo¤s contains at least d pairs of players. To complete the construction, suppose that all players choose the higher payo¤ platform during the initial stage while the remainder …ll out each platform up to its equilibrium share in the maturation stage. Clearly, maturation stage players cannot pro…tably deviate for reasons identical to the simultaneous game. If anyone deviates in the initial stage, his or her "slot" will simply be …lled by a maturation stage agent of the same type, so this too is unpro…table.
For the special case where d = 1, we can use this same construction to make a sharper statement:
Remark 2 When d = 1; an outcome is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential game if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game.
This case is primarily of interest as a robustness check. It shows that if we slightly perturb the simultaneous game by allowing one pair of players to move ahead of the others, the set of equilibria is completely una¤ected. In a way, this is surprising. One might think that the …rst move confers some commitment power as in the other strategic settings. The key here is the twosidedness of platform markets. While deviations by pairs of agents can alter the strategic situation, unilateral deviations cannot since any such deviation in the initial stage can be undone in the maturation stage.
When d > 1, the sets of equilibria in the two games do not perfectly coincide. The following example demonstrates a situation where an equilibrium of the simultaneous game does not survive in the sequential model. The key to the example is variation in the access fees on each platform. Depending on these fees, the set of subgame perfect equilibria in the sequential game can be a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria in the simultaneous game. To sum up, even when all agents coordinate on a single platform during the initial period of the life of the market, this is no guarantee that the "anointed" platform will dominate in the maturation phase. As with the baseline model, coexistence or tipping to either platform are all consistent with an equilibrium under full rationality. 21 22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 Cognitive Hierarchy Next, we study outcomes under the cognitive hierarchy model. Recall that expectations about the play of level-0 agents were key in determining behavior of more sophisticated types. These expectations still play a role in the sequential game, but the analysis is now complicated by the fact that agents in the maturation stage get to observe earlier choices, including those of the level-0 agents choosing during the initial stage. Thus the realizations of random play by level-0 agents also a¤ect play.
To reduce this complication and isolate the pure e¤ect of timing on choice behavior, consider a situation where the probability of a level-0 type, f (0), goes to zero in the limit. Speci…cally, let f z (k) be a sequence of probabilities over the levels of strategic sophistication where: lim
The idea here is that level-0 agents comprise a small fraction of the population. A special case of this assumption occurs when one considers a small perturbation from full rationality where higher cognitive types are strictly and exceedingly more likely than lower cognitive types. To maintain expositional simplicity of our analysis, we restrict attention to the case where all level-0 agents choose each platform with equal probability; that is, i = 1 2
. We shall refer to the combination of equiprobable platform choice and probabilities satisfying equation (8) as the "limit cognitive hierarchy"model. We are now in a position to characterize equilibrium in this setting.
Proposition 13
In the limit cognitive hierarchy model, all strategic types choose the risk dominant platform in the unique equilibrium at the limit.
Proposition 13 shows that the behavior of the cognitive hierarchy model is unchanged with the addition of dynamic entry. Restricting attention to the limit case, where realizations from random behavior by level-0 agents at the initial stage do not a¤ect subsequently outcomes enables a precise statement, but qualitative behavior is easily characterized outside this case. Speci…cally, if the risk dominant platform enjoys su¢ cient market share in the …rst period, then all strategic types in the second period will again coordinate on this platform. When the risk inferior platform enjoys high market share during the initial stage, strategic types will switch and coordinate on this platform instead. This latter situation can arise if a large fraction of agents are level-0, and the realizations of their random choices favor the risk inferior platform. Behavior of strategic types during the initial stage is simplerstrategic types will opt for the risk dominant platform for the usual reasons. The di¢ culty lies in determining the exact market share realizations that tip the balance between the two platforms at the maturation stage. These thresholds depend on the distribution of cognitive levels, the size of the initial and maturation phases, as well as the particular payo¤s under each platform. Since this adds little to understanding of the qualitative features of the cognitive hierarchy model, we eschew a detailed analysis.
Conclusion
While models of bounded rationality have been strongly embraced in interpreting data from laboratory experiments, their acceptance in applied settings has been much more limited. A compelling objection against their use is that the very ‡exibility that makes these models attractive for organizing lab data undermines their ability to make sharp predictions. For instance, quantal response equilibrium is a commonly used solution concept for analyzing experimental data, but, as shown by Haile, Hortacsu, and Kosenok (2008), its use is clearly problematic in applied settings as it can, under mild conditions, rationalize any set of observed choices.
Under platform competition, we showed that the situation is exactly reversed. The standard, fully rational model can justify a wide range of market structures owing to the combination of network and competitive e¤ects. In contrast, the boundedly rational cognitive hierarchy model yields unique predictions. Moreover, by varying key features of the platform competition setting, such as the ability to multi-home or the degree to which the platforms are horizontally di¤erentiated, we can identify which structural features lead to industry concentration versus those that lead to fragmentation. In particular, competition among agents of the same type, such as sellers on an online auction platform, does little to prevent the emergence of a dominant platform. Horizontal di¤erentiation, however, leads to fragmentation even if the degree of di¤erentiation is relatively modest.
From a managerial perspective, the model o¤ers key insights about successful platform strategy. Competing in single-homing markets where di¤erentiation is di¢ cult, managers should focus on reducing the risks to platform users. Quality of service, security and privacy of data, as well as refunds in the event that performance falls short all play a critical role in determining the risk ranking of a platform relative to its rivals. The model points out that this risk ranking is key to market share. This is broadly consistent with the business strategies pursued by eBay. EBay implemented a scheme through its PayPal subsidiary ensuring both buyers and sellers against non-performance by the counter-party thus reducing the risk associated with eBay auctions. EBay also changed their reporting on bid histories to better protect the privacy of users. Finally, eBay emphasizes 24/7 uptime for its site. Under multi-homing, quality and user value should be emphasized. For instance, in the credit card market, there has been a proliferation of cash-back bene…ts and low interest rates to capture market share. In online markets, short-run monetization strategies that come at the expense of the consumer experience o¤er a Faustian bargain: While pro…ts may initially increase, such strategies open the door to a higher value platform to gain dominance in the long-run. Where horizontal di¤erentiation has the potential to outpace vertical di¤erentiation, the former should be emphasized. This strategy may be seen by the recent advertising campaigns of eHarmony and ChristianMingle, two online dating sites. The former di¤erentiates itself from other sites by its concern with long-run compatibility rather than short-run opportunities for sexual access. ChristianMingle emphasizes the shared values of its user base-committed heterosexual Christians looking for a match literally made in heaven.
It is, however, worth noting that our cognitive hierarchy model shares a defect common to many models of bounded rationality-the choice behavior of non-strategic players is a free variable and, even when these types are a vanishingly small fraction of the population, their choices play a critical role in the resulting decisions of strategic players. The situation is analogous to that of behavioral types in the reputation literature (see, e.g. Kreps et al., 1982) . Despite this, several key qualitative features of industry structure, notably the emergence of a single platform accessed by all strategic types absent horizontal di¤erentiation, occur regardless of the assumed behavior of naïve types.
Saying more requires judgment about the motives of non-strategic types. One interpretation is that these types are completely uninformed about the particulars of each platform and hence choose at random. In the single homing model, we showed that this connected the cognitive hierarchy model to a much older equilibrium re…nements literature-choice behavior of strategic types corresponds to a risk dominant equilibrium. Thus, one (modest) contribution of the paper is to provide a behavioral micro-foundation for this re…nement. But the predictions under bounded rationality do not always coincide with risk dominance. Allowing for multi-homing does not change the identity of the risk dominant platform but substantially changes the behavior of strategic types. They now respond with a combination of multi-homing and exclusively choosing the Pareto dominant platform.
Compared to theory o¤erings, the empirical literature on platform competition is relatively sparse. Certainly, the complexity of these models combined with the resulting equilibrium multiplicity is not helpful in this regard. Perhaps our most important contribution is to show how allowing for bounded rationality gives rise to clear, testable predictions about how the structural features of platform competition translate into resulting market share performance. While our results are consistent with data from laboratory experiments and with key features of real-world platform markets, an important next step is to carefully examine these predictions empirically. This remains for future research.
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 Proof. Suppose to the contrary that, in an equilibrium, s women and t men enter platform i. Without loss of generality, we assume that s > t. Since women in platform i have no incentive to move to platform j,
The assumption of s > t implies
Therefore,
However, this implies that men in platform j will have incentives to move to platform i. Therefore, if s women and t men entering platform i is an equilibrium, then s = t.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Suppose we draw U A ( ) p A and U B (1 ) p B on the same graph for 2 [0; 1]. Given the market size and positive network externalities e¤ects,
for i; j 2 fA; Bg. If both U A and U B are increasing functions of the probability of an agent choosing that platform, then that immediately implies single-crossing of the two curves. Otherwise, U B ( ) p B and U A (1 ) p A will intersect at most twice given Assumption 5. However, if they intersect twice then U i (1) p i must be smaller than U j (0) p j with i 6 = j for at least one i. Given the upper bound on p i and Assumption 4, this is impossible. This implies that U A ( ) p A and U B (1 ) p B intersect exactly once and there is a unique such that
Now we analyze the equilibria under the cognitive hierarchy model. A level-0 agent chooses to join platform i with probability i . As a level-1 agent assumes that all other agents are of level-0, her expected payo¤ from joining platforms A and B are U A ( A ) p A and U B (1 A ) p B , respectively. First suppose A < . Then, all level-1 agents will choose to go to platform B. A level-2 agent believes that any of the other agents is of level-0 with probability (1) and of level-1 with probability f (1) f (0)+f (1) . Moreover, the agent believes that a level-0 agent chooses platform B with probability 1
A and a level-1 agent chooses platform B with probability 1. The expected payo¤ of a level-2 agent from platform A and B are U A (1) f (0)+f (1) p B , respectively. As
< A < , a level-2 agent will choose platform B. It can easily be shown that, a level-l agent believes that another agent chooses platform B with probability 1
for all l 1. As a result, her best response is to join platform B. Similar logic shows that if A > ; then all level-l agents will choose platform A for l 1.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. The proof that tipping is an equilibrium is analogous to the argument in Proposition 1. To establish conditions where coexisting equilibria exist, consider (p A ; p B ) such that
for some n 2 f1; 2; : : : ; N 1g. Note that, for each equation, at least one of the inequalities will be strict because of the market impact e¤ects. Then n players of each type choosing platform A and N n players of each type choosing platform B is an equilibrium. Under these platform choices, all agents make non-negative payo¤. If a female agent on platform B also joins platform A, she will have access to n new male agents while competing with n other female agents and paying an access fee of p A . However, as u A (n + 1; n) p A , she will have no incentive to multi-home. She will also have no incentive to choose platform A exclusively. Similarly, as u B (n + 1; n) p B , an agent on platform A will have no incentive to switch to platform B or multi-home. Subtracting u A (n; n) from the inequalities in equation (9) and u B (N n; N n) from the inequalities in equation (10) yields the inequalities in equation (3).
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that platform A is Pareto dominant. To ensure that the proposed equilibrium exists, the following conditions need to be satis…ed. An agent who is single-homing on platform A will not deviate to single-home on platform B if
and will not multi-home if
On the other hand, an agent single-homing on platform B will not single-home on platform A and will not choose to multi-home if
and
respectively. Finally, an agent who chooses to multi-home in this equilibrium will not deviate by choosing just one of the platforms if
for z 2 fA; Bg.
We next rearrange and simplify these equilibrium conditions. Equations (11) and (13) together imply
Equations (12) and (15), for z = A, lead to
Equations (13) and (15), for z = B, suggest that
Writing these expressions in terms of the market impact e¤ects yields the set of inequalities in the statement of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Suppose U A (N; N ) p A > U B (N; N ) p B and all level-0 agents join both platforms A and B. A level-1 agent assumes that all other agents are of level 0. Hence, she believes that all other agents join both platforms. Given that belief, if she joins only platform B, her net payo¤ is U B (N; N ) p B and her expected payo¤ if she joins only platform A is U A (N; N ) p A . If she joins both platforms then she does not gain any bene…t from joining platform B as she meets all the agents of the opposite type already at the Pareto dominant platform A. Her net payo¤ from multi-homing, thus, is U A (N; N ) p A p B . Hence, all level-1 agents will choose to go to platform A. A level-2 agent believes that any of the other agents is of level 0 with probability (1) and of level 1 with probability f (1) f (0)+f (1) . Moreover, she believes that all other agents join platform A and level-0 agents join platform B in addition to joining platform A. Hence, her optimal action is to join only platform A. Similar arguments show that all agents with a higher level of cognitive ability will choose to join only platform A. In the unique equilibrium, a level-0 agent joins both platform and a level-l agent joins only the Pareto dominant platform A for all l 1.
Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. Suppose A is the super-dominant platform. Then, any agent with sophistication level of 1 or higher will never choose single-homing on platform B over single-homing on platform A. Moreover, given Assumptions 5 and 6, both U mh and U sh;A ( ; ) are single-peaked in . Note that U mh (0; 0) p A p B < U sh;A (0; 0) p A and U mh 
Now we analyze the best responses of sophisticated agents given level-0 agents'behavior. First, consider the case that e < ; that is, relatively few level-0 agents choose a platform exclusively. Then it is optimal for a level-1 agent to choose only platform A as U mh e ; e p A p B < U sh;A e ; e p A . A level-2 agent then believes that other agents choose platforms
A and B exclusively with probabilities e f (0)+f (1) f (0)+f (1) and e f (0) f (0)+f (1) , respectively and chooses to multi-home with probability (1 2 e )f(0)
. That is, according to her beliefs, more agents join platform A exclusively and fewer agents join platform B exclusively compared to the beliefs of level-1 agents. Given Assumption 6, she gets strictly higher payo¤ by single-homing on platform A than multi-homing and will choose platform A exclusively in any equilibrium. Similarly, one can show that all level-l agents for l 1 will choose platform A when e < .
Next suppose e . Then, it is optimal for level-1 agents to multi-home. A level-2 agent believes that all other agents are of level 0 or 1 and will choose platforms A or B exclusively with probability e f (0) f (0)+f (1) each and will multi-home with probability (1 2 e )f(0)+f (1) f (0)+f (1) .
If
e f (0)
> then the level-2 agent will multi-home. Otherwise, she will choose platform A exclusively. In general, suppose k> 1 is such that
: Then agents of level l will multi-home for l <k and will choose platform A exclusively for l k in the unique equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. Suppose all agents choose to join their preferred platform. That is, f n A pairs of males and females join platform A and f n B pairs of males and females join platform B. If
then, given the bene…t from choosing one's own preferred platform ( ) and the market impact e¤ects, an agent located on platform A will have no incentive to join platform B instead.
In that case, an agent locating on platform B will have no incentive to join platform A instead. Similarly, if U f n A < 0 then B ; f n B + U f n A ensures that none of the agents will have an incentive to deviate from the strategy of choosing her preferred platform. Now suppose all agents join their non-preferred platforms. That is, f n B pairs of males and females join platform A and f n A pairs of males and females join platform B. An agent on platform A receives a net payo¤ of u A (f n B ; f n B ) p A . If she decided to join her preferred platform B instead, she can earn a net payo¤ of
In that case,
Therefore, an agent located on platform A will have no incentive to locate on her preferred platform B instead. Similarly, agents locating on platform B will have no incentive to locate on platform A if A; f n B U f n B . Finally, suppose f n A m pairs of male and female agents choose their preferred platform A, m pairs of male and female agents choose their non-preferred platform B and f n B pairs of male and female agents choose their preferred platform B for some m 2 f1; 2; : : : ; f n A 1g.
In that case, an agent who is located on her platform B will have no incentive to join platform A instead no matter whether her preferred platform is A or B.
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Proof of Proposition 11
Proof. Suppose each level-0 agent chooses her preferred platform with probability e 1 2
. Given the bound on stipulated by equation (6), U i (0) p i + < U j (1) p j for i 2 fA; Bg. Moreover, U i (1) p i + > U j (0) p j . Assumption 5 implies single-crossing of U i ( ) p i + and U j (1 ) p j for 2 [0; 1] ; i 2 fA; Bg and j 6 = i. Assumption 7 then implies that for all > min and if e n i < e n j then
. Therefore, a level-1 agent whose preferred platform is i will choose platform i. A level-2 agents believe that level-0 agents choose platform i with probability e e n i N + 1 e f n j N and level-1 agents choose their preferred platforms. That is, she believes that an agent is likely to choose platform i with probability (1) . Of course, if e n i e n j then
e n i N otherwise. Therefore, a level-2 agent whose preferred platform is platform i will choose platform i. In general, an agent of sophistication level l for l > 0, whose preferred platform is platform i, believes that her expected net payo¤s from joining platforms i and j are U i ( ) p i + and U j (1 ) p j , respectively for some 2
if e n i e n j and for some 2 e n i N ; 1 2 otherwise. Thus, all agents with sophistication level l > 0 will choose their preferred platform in the unique equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. In period 2, agents will choose platforms that are best responses given the location choices of agents in period 1 and strategies of other players choosing in period 2. Suppose there is a subgame perfect equilibrium where s women and t men join platform i. Without loss of any generality, we assume that s > t. That is, platform i has more women than men and platform j has more men than women. First assume that at least one man joins platform j and at least one woman joins platform i in period 2. Using the logic in lemma 1, we can show that this cannot constitute an equilibrium as at least one of these players can pro…tably deviate. Now suppose all men moving on period 2 join platform i and all women moving on period 2 join platform j. Then, if a man who is supposed to join platform j in period 1 deviate by joining platform i instead, he would compete with at most t other men 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 and have at least s women to choose from on platform i. Since this deviation should not be pro…table in equilibrium, we can surmise that
Similarly, if a woman who joins platform i in period 1 deviates by joining platform j instead, she would compete with at most N s other women and have at least N t men to choose from on platform j. This implies that
Given that s > t,
That is impossible implying that one of these deviations will actually be pro…table. Next, suppose that all men moving on period 2 join platform i but at least one woman moving on period 2 joins platform i. Consider the deviation that one man who is supposed to join platform j in period 1 chooses platform i instead. Note that the number of men in platform i can be at most t + 1 (including himself). As any reduction in the number of men choosing platform i in period 2 makes this deviation pro…table, we assume that men do not change their response. First, suppose that the number of women choosing platform i in period 2 does not decrease as a result of this deviation. However, then we can again use the same logic as above to show that either such a deviation or deviation by one of the women joining platform i in period 2 will be pro…table. If the suggested deviation decreases the number of women choosing platform i in period 2, then that implies that one or more of the women will choose platform j instead of platform i in period 2 in response to this deviation. Nevertheless, for such an agent, platform i is more attractive than before as it will have one more man and (weakly) fewer women. Thus, she will not make such a deviation. Similarly, we can show that all women and at least one man joining platform j on period 2 cannot happen in equilibrium either. Hence, under all 4 possible cases, di¤erent numbers of men and women cannot choose a platform in an equilibrium of the sequential game. Thus, the equilibrium market shares can be described as (n; N n) where n pairs of men and women join platform A and the remaining N n pairs of men and women join platform B. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 Proof of Proposition 12 Proof. To prove the …rst statement, suppose there is an equilibrium of the simultaneous game where n pairs of players choose platform A and N n pairs of players choose platform B. Without loss of any generality, we assume that n d as at least one of the platforms will receive at least as many as d pair of players. Given that this is an equilibrium, we require that u A (n; n) p A u B (N n + 1; N n) p B and u B (N n; N n) p B u A (n + 1; n) p A :
Note that this equilibrium is supported by a large set of access fees. Let us consider the equilibrium where p B = u B (N n; N n) and u A (n; n) > p A > u A (n + 1; n). This implies that u A (n; n) p A > u B (N n; N n) p B . Players who choose platform A are better o¤ than players who choose platform B. We now construct this equilibrium in the sequential game. In this equilibrium, all agents moving in period 1 choose platform A. In period 2, n d pairs of players choose platform A and the rest choose platform B. Consider the strategy pro…le where the strategy for players in periods 1 is to join platform A. In period 2, players follow the following strategy: if they observe that n k M men and n k F women have chosen platform A in period 1, then k M men and k F women choose platform A and N d k M men and N d k F women choose platform B. Given that n d, k M and k F can only take positive values. As the equilibrium constraints are satis…ed, this constitutes best response from all players moving in period 2. If a player unilaterally deviates in period 1 and chooses platform B instead of platform A, the market share of the two platforms will not change given these strategy pro…les. However, she will be strictly worse o¤ because of the deviation as she will be in platform B. Thus, there will be no pro…table deviation under this strategy pro…le. If n = N ; let us assume that the access fees are such that tipping to platform A is Pareto dominant. Then, all players moving in period 1 choose platform A. In period 2, all players choose platform A if no player chose platform B in period 1. Otherwise, players choose a (potentially) mixed strategy simultaneous equilibrium given the platform choice of period 1 players. Now, if a period 1 player unilaterally deviates, then the …nal outcome of the game will be di¤erent from market tipping to platform A. However, given that tipping to platform A is Pareto dominant, this will not be a pro…table deviation for the player. Thus, the proposed strategy pro…le will constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential game where the market tips to platform A. Therefore, for any n 2 f0; 1; : : : ; N g, there exists a set of access fees such that market shares of (n; N n) occurs in an equilibrium of both the simultaneous and sequential games.
Next we prove the second statement. Suppose that, given the access fees, tipping to platform A occurs in an equilibrium of the sequential game. Thus, the access fees are such that there is no bene…t for a player to unilaterally deviate to platform B in period 2. Then, tipping to platform A will also be an equilibrium of the simultaneous game. Now consider an equilibrium of the sequential game with market shares (n; N n) with n 2 f1; : : : ; N 1g. None of these players has an incentive to unilaterally deviate. Without loss of any generality, consider a player who joins platform A in period 2. The no deviation condition implies that u A (n; n) p A u B (N n + 1; N n) p B :
If there is a player who chooses platform B in period 2, then u B (N n; N n) p B u A (n + 1; n) p A :
If there is no such player, then all players (both men and women) moving in period 2 join platform A and n N d. However, if equation (17) does not hold then a player joining platform B in period 1 will have incentives to unilaterally deviate and join platform A instead. Thus, both equations (16) and (17) must hold. However, that means that there must be an equilibrium of the simultaneous game where n pairs of male and female agents choose platform A and the rest choose platform B.
Proof of Proposition 13
Proof. We …rst construct the putative equilibrium and then we show that it is unique. To see that everyone choosing the risk dominant platform is a limit equilibrium, suppose that the realization in the …rst period was that everyone chose the risk dominant platform. Then, clearly, all strategic players (cognitive sophistication level of 1 or higher) will choose this platform in the second period. Given this, we now turn to …rst period behavior: Level-1 agents will choose the risk dominant platform since they view all other players as being level-0 and hence choosing the risk dominant platform is a best response. By equation (8) ; level-2 agents will anticipate that nearly all other players are level-1; therefore, they too will choose the risk dominant platform. An analogous argument shows that players with higher levels of sophistication will also choose this platform. Finally, equation (8) implies that the probability that all agents moving in period 1 choose the risk dominant platform goes to one in the limit. Therefore, second period players will also choose this platform. This establishes that all strategic agents choosing the risk dominant platform is an equilibrium. Finally, notice that, in any equilibrium, any level-1 player in the …rst period will choose the risk dominant platform given that she believes that all other players randomly choose a platform with equal probability. All higher level agents will do the same given equation (8) .
Subgame perfection requires that period 2 players best respond to the outcome of the …rst period, therefore all strategic agents will choose the risk dominant platform in that period as well. Hence, the equilibrium identi…ed above is the unique equilibrium of the limit cognitive hierarchy model.
B Endogenizing Access Fees
While the model treats access fees as exogenous, in this section we show that coexistence is consistent with equilibrium even when platforms choose fees optimally. Speci…cally, suppose that platforms simultaneously choose access fees prior to agents deciding on which platform to locate. As is the case in the rest of the model, platforms charge the same access fee to male and female agents. The following proposition shows that the key condition for coexistence is that the magnitude of the market impact e¤ects must be su¢ ciently large. Formally,
Proposition 14
Suppose that market impact e¤ects are such that, for some n 2 f1; :::; N 1g
i;n N n n u i (n + 1; n) j;N n n N n u j (N n + 1; N n)
Then it is a coexisting equilibrium for n agents of each type to choose platform i with the remainder choosing platform j where i charges p i = u i (n; n) and j charges p j = u j (N n; N n).
Proof. Consider the following proposed equilibrium. First, platforms i and j choose access fees p i = u i (n; n) and p j = u j (N n; N n). Then, agents 1 to n of each type, for some n 2 f1; 2; : : : ; N 1g, follow the following strategy: choose platform i if u i (n; n) p i u j (N n + 1; N n) p j and u i (n; n) p i ; choose platform j otherwise as long as u j (N n + 1; N n) p j and else choose neither platform. Similarly, agents n + 1 to N of each type choose platform j if u j (N n; N n) p j u i (n + 1; n) p i and u j (N n; N n) p j :
Then, …rst n pairs of male and female agents join platform i because they get zero net payo¤ from platform i and negative net payo¤ from platform j. The remaining agents join platform j because they get zero net payo¤ from that platform and negative net payo¤ from platform i. Now, platforms i and j will have no incentive to change their pricing in the …rst stage if they cannot raise pro…t by choosing di¤erent access fees. Take platform i: to attract agents who would choose platform j otherwise (agents 1 to n of each type), it needs to charge an access fee of u i (n + 1; n) or lower. In that case, all agents will choose platform i. This is not pro…table if nu i (n; n) N u i (n + 1; n) =) n (u i (n; n) u i (n + 1; n)) (N n) u i (n + 1; n) =) n i;n (N n) u i (n + 1; n) =) i;n N n n u i (n + 1; n) :
Similarly, platform j will not try to attract agents otherwise choosing platform i by reducing p j if (N n) u j (N n; N n) N u j (N n + 1; N n) =) j;n n N n u j (N n + 1; N n) :
Thus, the proposed strategies constitute a subgame perfect coexisting equilibrium where platforms choose pro…t maximizing access fees. While Proposition 14 speci…es conditions on market impact e¤ects where coexistence can occur in equilibrium, one may worry about whether such conditions can ever be satis…ed. To allay this concern, notice that the market in Example 1 supports three coexisting equilibria when platform choose the access fees. Five pairs of men and women joining each platform with p A = p B = 47:78 is an equilibrium. Moreover, 4 pairs of men and women joining platform i and 6 pairs of men and women joining platform j with p i = 38:33 and p j = 57:22 are equilibria for i 2 fA; Bg. Hence, unequal market shares are also consistent with optimal fee choice by platforms. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
